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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Is Khalid Iqbal Khawar a limited purpose public figure
because he invited the press to photograph him, granted a
media interview, and was drawn into a controversy through
a police investigation and a widely distributed book?

2.

Is there clear and convincing evidence to support a finding
of actual malice when Globe presented the truth to the
public in its article and relied upon a credible and
reputable source?

3.

Is the appellate court incorrect in its determination that
the neutral reportage privilege does not exist in
California?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pre^liminary Statement
On March 14, 1990, Respondent Khalid Iqbal Khawar filed his
Second Amended Complaint in a defamation suit against Globe
International, Inc.
Morrow.

("Globe"), Roundtable Publishing, and Robert

(Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 1.)

Respondent settled with Roundtable.

Prior to the trial,

See. Khawar v,^ Globe Int'l.

Inc.■ 51 Cal. App. 4th 14, 21 (2d Dist. 1996).

A default was

entered against Morrow, from whom the plaintiffs sought two
million dollars.

iiL_

On March 25, 1994, the jury returned a Special Verdict.
(J.A. at 593.)

The verdict determined that (1) Globe had acted

negligently in failing to learn whether the statements published
in their article were false;

(2) the statements were defamatory;

(3) Respondent was a private figure with respect to the events
surrounding the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy;
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(4)

Globe published the article either knowing that the statements
were false or with reckless disregard for the truth; and (5)
Globe published the article with malice or oppression.
594-95.)

(J.A. at

The jury also found that the article published by Globe

was an accurate and neutral report of the statements and charges
made by Morrow in his book, The Senator Must n-ip>.

(J.A. at 595.)

The jury granted Respondent both general damages and in a Special
Verdict (Phase Two), punitive damages.

(J.A. at 596, 598.)

On April 15, 1994, the trial judge reversed the default
judgment against Morrow, finding that Respondent was not
identifiable in the book and that the book was not "of or
concerning" plaintiff Ali Ahmad,

(J.A. at 534-35.)

The trial

judge independently found that the photograph in the article was
the original source of libel because he believed that the
photograph made Respondent identifiable for the first time.
(J.A. at 521.)

On June 5, 1996, the Court of Appeal for the

Second District, Division Seven, affirmed the decision with
Justice Gold writing the opinion.
at 41.

See Khawar, 51 Cal. App. 4th

This Court granted review on September 25, 1996.
Statement of Facts

On April 4, 1989, Globe published an article written by John
Blackburn regarding Robert Morrow's book. The .Senator Must Die.
(J.A. at 148, 583.)

The Senator Must Die presents one of the

many theories concerning the assassination of Senator Robert
Kennedy.

(J.A. at 507, 566.)

Morrow wrote that the triggerman

was not Sirhan B. Sirhan, but rather, a man named Ali Ahmand.
(J.A. at 566.)

Morrow also published four pictures in his book
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with the caption:

"Ali Ahmand, in sweater, next to Robert

Kennedy minutes before Kennedy was assassinated.
camera."

(J.A. at 579-80.)

Note SLR

Following Kennedy's assassination.

Respondent was interviewed by the Los Angeles Police Department
and Federal Bureau of Investigation on several occasions.
at 381.)

(J.A.

Based upon the police investigation of Respondent,

Morrow concluded that "Khalid Iqbal" was Ali TUimand.

(J.A. at

576. )
Reporting on the appearance of Morrow's assassination
theory, the headline of Globe's article stated:
agpnt riaims:
(J.A. at 148.)

"Former CiA

IRANIANS KILLED BOBBY KENNEDY FOR THE MAFIA."
Appearing below the headline were two

photographs, one with an arrow directed at the likeness of
Respondent as he stood on the podium next to Kennedy, the other
of Sirhan B. Sirhan.
stated:

(J.A. at 148.)

The accompanying caption

"Author Robert Morrow claims an Iranian agent (arrow),

not Sirhan Sirhan (right), killed Kennedy with a gun disguised to
look like a camera."

(J.A, at 148.)

Jonathan Kirsh, an expert witness retained by Globe, opined
that the article, "fairly, straightforwardly reports what is
written and published in that book."

(J.A. at 469.)

The jury

agreed and specifically held that the article was an accurate and
neutral report of the statements and charges made by Morrow in
The Senator Must Die.

(J.A. at 595.)

Dissatisfied with the

jury's findings, the trial judge independently found that Globe
made Respondent identifiable for the first time by enlarging and
retouching the photograph.

(J.A. at 520.)
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In the early stages of writing the article, John Blackburn
read the book and interviewed Morrow for details regarding the
book's content.

(J.A. at 318.)

Although he has no recollection

of questioning Morrow's credibility, Blackburn still attempted to
contact the alleged assassin, Ali Ahmand.

(J.A. at 329-30, 350.)

The managing editor of Globe, Robert Taylor, testified that he
felt there was no need to investigate Morrow's allegations any
further.

Khawar, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 33.

Upon interviewing Morrow, Blackburn was informed that Morrow
had been linked to the Central Intelligence Agency.
313.)

(J.A. at

In addition. Morrow's best selling book. Betrayal. has

been attributed with helping to create the House Select Committee
on Assassinations.

(J.A. at 220, 517.)

Furthermore, Morrow

participated in a panel discussion of assassination researchers
regarding his theory on Senator Kennedy's death.

(J.A. at

498-500 . )
Turning to the facts surrounding Kennedy's assassination,
the subject matter of Morrow's book. Respondent testified that he
made his way on stage to both report upon the events taking place
and to be photographed with Kennedy.

(J.A. at 369-70.)

Respondent gave a camera to his friend to take the picture.
(J.A. at 370.)

Respondent was cognizant of the tremendous media

attention directed at the stage when he placed himself before the
flashing cameras of the vast international press corps.
420-21.)

(J.A. at

Ten days after the assassination. Time magazine

published a photograph of Respondent in his yellow sweater as he
stood next to the Senator.

(J.A. at 422.)
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Proud of his own photograph depicting Kennedy and himself
standing on the podium, Respondent showed the photograph to
several thousand people.

(J.A. at 388-89.)

Many of the pictures

and films from that evening are also broadcast on television,
year in and year out, to memorialize the assassination of Robert
Kennedy.

(J.A. at 423.)

The thousands of photographs taken on

the night of the assassination are available to the public at the
California State Archives.

(J.A. at 151, 159.)

Additionally,

this long-term public interest in the assassination has yielded
tables of literature presenting numerous theories on the killing.
(J.A. at 498.)
Once The Senator Mn.st Die was published and Globe's
subsequent article came out. Respondent testified that he
received telephone calls from friends in Bangkok and New Jersey,
as well as death threats from other unidentifiable sources.
(J.A. at 396.)

When Respondent filed this lawsuit, a Bakersfield

television station provided him with an opportunity for a public
interview.

(J.A. at 398-99, 428.)

Respondent accepted the

invitation, spoke to the press, and the interview was broadcast
on the evening news.

(J.A. at 399, 428.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUT^ENT

Under this Court's totality of the circumstances test,
Respondent, Khalid Iqbal Khawar, is a limited purpose public
figure.

Respondent voluntarily assumed the risk of injury to his

reputation when he stood before the flashing cameras of the
international press corps.

As a result. Respondent was

involuntarily drawn into the controversy through the ensuing
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police investigation and Morrow's book.

In order to defend his

reputation and counter Morrow's theory. Respondent voluntarily
utilized his access to the media by granting a televised
interview.

The totality of these circumstances makes Respondent

a limited purpose public figure.
Petitioner did not act with actual malice in publishing the
article.

By including Sirhan B. Sirhan's photograph and

acknowledging him as the convicted killer. Globe did not
purposefully or recklessly disregard the truth.

Moreover,

Morrow's connections to the CIA and his congressional
commendations provide more than enough support for the jury's
finding that he is a reputable source.

Because Morrow is both

credible and reputable, Globe's failure to conduct a thorough
investigation is inconsequential.
Finally, the jury also found that the article presented a
neutral and accurate report of Morrow's conspiracy theory.

Whil^

Courts of Appeal have yet to explicitly adopt the
neutral reportage privilege, they have gradually imported its
rationale into the actual malice test and fair and true report
privilege.

However, several federal circuits, as well as some

district courts within the Ninth Circuit, have already
established and applied the neutral reportage privilege.

To

ensure the breathing space required for robust and wide open
debate on public controversies, the neutral reportage privilege
should now be adopted in California.
For the reasons as stated herein, this case presents a ripe
opportunity for this Court to adopt the neutral reportage
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privilege.

Furthermore, because Respondent is a limited purpose

public figure, and Globe did not publish the article with actual
malice, this Court should reverse the decision of the appellate
court.
ARGUMENT
I.

UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, RESPONDENT IS A
LIMITED PURPOSE PUBLIC FIGURE BECAUSE HE VOLUNTARILY PLACED
HIMSELF IN THE PUBLIC EYE, HE WAS INVOLUNTARILY DRAWN INTO
THE ASSASSINATION CONTROVERSY, AND HE VOLUNTARILY USED HIS
ACCESS TO THE MEDIA TO DEFEND HIS REPUTATION.
The United States Supreme Court has determined that a public

figure cannot recover damages in a defamation action, unless it
is proved that the defamatory statement was made with actual
malice.

See Curtis Publ^g Co. v. Butts. 388 U.S. 130, 155

(1967).

In Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc.. 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)

(Powell, J.), the Court examined how one becomes a public figure
and distinguished an "all purpose public figure" from a "limited
purpose public figure."

Most commonly, one becomes a limited

purpose public figure when he voluntarily "thrust [s himself] to
the forefront of [a] particular public controvers[y] in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved."

Id.

in

certain rare instances, it "may [also] be possible for someone to
[involuntarily] become a [limited purpose] public figure through
no purposeful action of his own."

Id.

In Reader^s Digest Ass'n^ v. Superior Court. 37 Cal. 3d 244,
253 (1984)

(Broussard, Acting C.J., expressing the unanimous view

of the Court), this Court summarized the twofold rationale from
Gertz.

First, public figures have assumed the risk of injury to

7

their reputation by voluntarily placing themselves before the
public eye.

Sea Reader^s Digest. 37 Cal. 3d at 253.

Second,

public figures have greater access to the media, which enables
them to counter any defamatory falsehood made against them.
i

Se^

Utilizing this rationale, this Court has adopted a totality

of the circumstances test to determine whether someone is a
limited purpose public figure.

See id. at 255.

In Reader^ a

Digest, this Court unanimously held that "such a determination ig
often a close question which can only be resolved by considering
the totality of the circumstances which comprise each individual
controversy."

id.

The trial court must determine whether a person is a public
figure as a matter of law.

Sfi£. Weingartf^n v. Rlonk. 102 Cal.

App. 3d 129, 134-35 (1st Dist. 1980).

Upon review, an appellate

court must independently examine the entire record de novo to
ascertain whether there is substantial evidence to support the
trial court's decision.
927, 933

See. Denney v. Lawrencf^. 22 Cal. App. 4th

(4th Dist. 1994).
Respondent Assumed the Risk of Injury_tQ His Repufatinr)
When He Stood Near Senator Kennedy with the Intpnr
the International Press Corps Would Photograph Him

Respondent is a limited purpose public figure because he
assumed the risk of injury to his reputation when he voluntarily
placed himself before the flashing cameras of the international
press corps.

Moments before Senator Kennedy was assassinated,

Respondent gave a camera to his friend and then made his way on
stage to have his picture taken with the Senator.

8

(J.A. at 369,

370.)

Respondent was aware of the tremendous media attention

focused on Kennedy and he knew that his photograph was being
taken by the press.

(J.A. at 420-21.)

Similarly, in Denney^ the brother of an accused killer
assumed the risk of injury to his reputation when he provided one
photograph of himself to the Press-Enterprise newspaper.
App. 4th at 931.

22 Cal.

That newspaper then published the photograph

and misidentified Roger Denney as the killer.

See id. at 932.

The Court of Appeal of California, Fourth District, concluded
that Denney was a limited purpose public figure, rejecting Roger
Denney's assertion that he did not place himself in the public
eye by giving his photograph to the press.

See id. at 934, 936.

While Roger Denney provided only one photograph to the
newspaper; Respondent thrust himself before the flashing cameras
of the entire international press corps.

{J.A. at 420-21.)

Moreover, Respondent showed his picture with the Senator to
thousands of people.

(J.A. at 388-89.)

Consistent with the

underlying rationale in Denney. Respondent is a limited purpose
public figure because he assumed the risk of injury to his
reputation when he placed himself before the throngs of reporters
photographing Kennedy.
B.

Respondent Was Involuntarily Drawn into the Controversy
of Robert Kennedy's Assassination Through the Policta
Investigation and MnrrowVq Rook.

Respondent is a limited purpose public figure because he was
involuntarily drawn into the controversy regarding Kennedy's
assassination.

Not all matters of public interest which are
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deemed newsworthy are public controversies.

See Time^ Tnc. v.

Firestone/ 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976); see also Hutchinson
PrQxmire, 443 U.S. ill, 135 (1979)

(holding that an issue of

general public concern is not a controversy).

Rather, a "'public^

controversy' is any topic upon which sizable segments of society
have different, strongly held views."
816 F. Supp. 218, 223 (S.D.N.Y 1993)

Maantaanbuu v. Abernathy.
(quoting Lei-man v. Flynf

Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 138 (2d Cir. 1984)).

Furthermore,

the resolution of these strongly held views must impact
non-participants to the debate.

Waldbaum y,. Fairchild

Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1297 (D.C. cir. 1980) .

When ^

public controversy does exist, on certain rare occasions an
individual may be involuntarily drawn into the controversy and
become a limited purpose public figure.

See Hertz, 418 U.S. at

345.
1■

A. public controversy exists because of the rnhncit
public debate and long-term media attenf-ion
focused on the assassination of Robert Kennedy.

California courts have found an expansive range of issues to
be public controversies.

See Copp v. Paxton, 45 Cal. App. 4th

829, 846 (1st Dist. 1996)

(finding the debate over earthquake

disaster mitigation in public schools to be a public
controversy); Nadel v. Regents of the tJniv. of Cal.. 28 Cal. App.
4th 1251, 1255, 1269 (1st Dist. 1994)

(finding the construction

of volleyball courts on People's Park in Berkeley to be the
subject of a public controversy) ; Mn.c;esian v. McClatchy
New.spapers, 233 Cal. App. 3d 1685, 1700-01 (5th Dist. 1991)
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{finding the debate over who should receive a gambling license
and whether horse racing should be conducted on Sundays to be
public controversies); Kaufman v. Fidelity Fed. Sav. and Loan
Ass^n, 140 Cal. App. 3d 913, 917, 921 (4th Dist. 1983)

(finding a

dispute over the re-zoning of property for commercial purposes to
be a public controversy).
Here, a public controversy over the identity of Senator
Kennedy's assassin exists.

Following the killing, conferences

were held, panel discussions took place, and theorists
disseminated literature on the Senator's death.
498-500.)

(J.A. at

Moreover the killing of a United States Senator, the

potential future President of the United States, moments after he
won the California Primary, impacted the nation.

(J.A. at 369.)

Because of the vibrant debate over the identity of the assassin,
a public controversy arose in the wake of Kennedy's death.
2.

Rpoause of Respondent's.presence Qn_stage. he
heoame the sub-ieot of public inquiry_and was
involuntarily drawn into the controversy.

Occasionally a private individual may be drawn into a public
controversy, making them an involuntary limited purpose public
figure.

See Gertz. 418 u.s. at 345.

In Dameron v^...Washington

Tnc. . 779 F.2d 736, 738, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the air
traffic controller on duty at Dulles airport at the time of the
Mt. Weather plane crash, was held to be an involuntary limited
purpose public figure.

The controller. Merle Dameron, was not

responsible for the plane crash and was exonerated of any
liability by a federal district court.
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Sfifi. id. at 738.

Yet,

through no purposeful action of his own, Dameron became the
subject of an investigation by the National Transportation Safety
Board.

See Dameron. 779 F.2d at 738.

Based upon the

circumstances of the investigation, a researcher and reporter for
The Washingtonian magazine independently concluded that Dameron
was responsible for the crash.

See id.

Similarly, Respondent happened to be present at the
Ambassador Hotel when Kennedy was shot.

(J.A. at 371.)

As a

result, on several occasions the Los Angeles Police Department
and Federal Bureau of Investigation interviewed him.
381.)

(J.A. at

Like the researcher in Dameron who reviewed the NTSB

investigations, Morrow reviewed the official police reports.
(J.A. at 576.)

Then, like the reporter for The Washingtonian.

Morrow independently concluded that Respondent killed Kennedy.
(J.A. at 576.)

Thus, through no purposeful action of his own, as

the subject of public inquiry, Respondent was involuntarily drawn
into the controversy.
Admittedly, cases are exceedingly rare where individuals are
found to be involuntary limited purpose public figures.
GertZ, 418 U.S. at 345.

See

Nevertheless, in Sipple v- Chronicle

Publ'g Cq., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1049-50 (1st Dist. 1984), the
California Court of Appeal for the First District found an
individual to be such a figure.

sippi

involved a thwarted

assassination attempt on United States President Gerald Ford.
154 Cal. App, 3d at 1043.

On September 22, 1975, while President

Ford was visiting San Francisco, Sara Jane Moore attempted to
shoot him.

See id.

Oliver Sipple, who was in the crowd.
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"grabbed or struck" Moore's arm before she could kill the
President.

Sipple. 154 Cal. App. 3d at 1043.

Despite no one being certain whether Sipple actually saved
the President's life, several newspapers speculated that
President Ford did not thank Sipple for his actions because of
Sipple's sexual orientation.

Sea id. at 1043-44.

Sipple

subsequently sued the San Francisco Chronicle, among other
newspapers, for invasion of privacy.

See id. at 1044.

In

justifying its holding that the articles did not disclose private
facts, the California Court of Appeal concluded that Sipple was
an involuntary limited purpose public figure.

See id. at 1049.

Interestingly, it was Oliver Sipple's affirmative act of
grabbing Moore's arm that became the hook which reeled him into
the controversy.

Like Oliver Sipple, it was Respondent's

affirmative act of making his way on stage and placing himself
next to Senator Kennedy that caused him to become the subject of
public inquiry.

In Darneron. the air traffic controller was

involuntarily drawn into the controversy through the
investigation that surrounded the plane crash and subsequent
media reports on the incident.

779 F.2d at 738.

Like Merle

Dameron, Respondent was investigated and, through Morrow's book,
Respondent was made a central figure in the Kennedy assassination
controversy.

Thus, under the totality of the circumstances test,

Respondent, like Oliver Sipple and Merle Dameron, involuntarily
became a limited purpose public figure.
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C.

By Granting a Televised Interview. Respondent: Proved
That He Had Access to the Media, .Tlirough Which He
Defended His Reputation.

Respondent is a limited purpose public figure because he
%

voluntarily granted an interview to a television station.

This

Court has held that a limited purpose public figure has greater
access to the media, which enables him to counter any defamatory
falsehood made against him.

See Reader^ g nigeat-, 37 Cal. 3d at

253; but,..jsee Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, 37 F.3d 1541, 1563
(4th Cir. 1994)

(holding that defensive replies to defamatory

attacks which are made through the media do not transform one
into a public figure).

Once an individual attempts to influence

public opinion regarding a preexisting controversy by engaging
in interviews with the press, that individual then becomes a
limited purpose public figure.

S&& Reader's Digest, 37 Cal. 3d

at 256.
Consistent with this rationale, granting a press interview
where there is no public controversy does not make one a limited
purpose public figure.

See Firestone. 424 U.S. at 454-55 n.3;

see also Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 134-35 (holding that despite
Hutchinson's access to the media, without a public controversy he
did not voluntarily inject himself into a public debate).

But

where a public controversy does exist, and an individual attempts
to "influence public and media opinion regarding their cause,
such significant, voluntary efforts to inject oneself into the
public arena require that such a person or organization be
classified as a public figure in any related defamation
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actions."^

Reader's Digest, 37 Cal. 3d at 256 (emphasis added);

see generally Liu v._Mew York News, 183 A.D.2d 443 (N.Y. 1992);
Capuano v. Outlet Co., 579 A.2d 469 (R.I. 1990).
Here, Respondent had access to the media as demonstrated by
his televised interview.

(J.A. at 399, 428.)

In Street v.

645 F.2d 1227, 1234 (6th Cir. 1981), the court found that because
"[t]he press clamored to interview [Victoria Street, s]he clearly
had access to the media and was able to broadcast her view of the
events."

Similarly, the media approached Respondent for an

interview and he accepted the opportunity.

(J.A. at 399, 428.)

Thus, Respondent is a limited purpose public figure because he
utilized his access to the media to defend his reputation in the
public arena.
This Court has held that once an individual attempts to
influence public opinion regarding a preexisting controversy by
engaging in interviews with the press, that individual becomes a
limited purpose public figure.
at 256.

See Reader'.s Digest. 37 Cal. 3d

In Reader's Digest, Synanon Church, a drug

rehabilitation organization turned alternative life-style
community, sent out letters to the media and engaged in a
publicity campaign.

Id. at 255-56.

This Court determined that

^
"Radio or television appearances have often been cited as a
factor in finding the plaintiff to be a public figure ... as
has granting interviews to the press .... Likewise, where the
plaintiff made an effort to avoid press contact, many courts have
cited this as a reason for refusing to find the plaintiff a
public figure." Tracy A. Bateman, Who is "Public: Figiirp" fn-r
Purposes of Defamation Action. 19 A.L.R. 5th 1, 60-62 (1995).
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these attempts to influence the media and preserve the Church's
reputation,

"went far beyond defensive litigation."

Digest/ 37 Cal. 3d at 255.

Reader's

Thus, this Court held that Synanon's

publicity campaign provided them with access to the media, and as
such, they voluntarily became public figures for the purposes of
the litigation.

See id. at 256.

Several of the courts of appeal in California have liberally
applied this "media access" rationale.

In Deanfiy, the Court of

Appeal of California, Fourth District, held that when an
individual gives a press interview, it must be deemed that he did
so voluntarily.

22 Cal. App. 4th at 935.

In that case, Roger

Denney, the brother of a man accused of killing his wife, granted
only two press interviews.

Saa id.

The court held that Roger

Denney voluntarily injected himself into the public controversy
surrounding the charge that his brother was a murderer.

id.

at 936.
Similarly, in Rudnick v

11nn, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1183,

1187 (2d Dist. 1994) , the Court
-^
r-Second
j
wuic of
oc Annfaai
Appeal of ^
California,
District, held that where a rancher
idler merely contacted one reports
to write an article and assisted
u ,had, contacted
^ him,
.
oxai-ea another who
these actions alone made the rancher a
•
iiex a limited purpose public
figure.
In that case, Marcus RudnirV
.2
.
, , .
nick wanted to defend himself
against accusations that he was resnnn<=iKi
^
.
esponsible for the degradation
of the public land preserve where his cattlo
...
cattle grazed. See id.
T(
broadcast his cause, Rudnick gave tour*?
.
yavc tours of the land preserve to
the two reporters, whereupon
both
•.
t'
wtn wrotf*
wrote articles
promoting
Rudnick's view.

Saa

Thus, by makinfr
.
y making simply two attempts to
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use the media to defend his reputation, Rudnick made himself a
limited purpose public figure.

See Rudnick, 25 Cal. App. 4th at

1187.
Similarly, in this case Respondent gave a television
interview.

(J.A. at 399, 428.)

Like Roger Denney who defended

his brother, and Marcus Rudnick who defended his reputation,
Respondent was at the center of a public controversy and he used
the media to defend himself.

(J.A. at 566.)

Unlike Synanon

Church, Respondent did not engage in a long-term publicity
campaign to save his reputation.
one interview.

Rather, Respondent granted only

(J.A. at 399, 428.)

According to Rudnick and

npnneyr however, minimal contacts with the media are still
sufficient to render an individual a limited purpose public
figure.
The rationale underlying Reader's Digest. Rudnick, and
Denney applies when the individual has made only one attempt to
defend his reputation through the media.
Where the plaintiff used the media to respond to the
defamation . . . courts have considered this to be
important, given the Gertz court's reasoning that
public figures usually enjoy significantly greater
access to the channels of effective communication and
thus have a more realistic opportunity to counteract
false statements than private individuals.
Tracy A. Bateman, Who is "Public Rigure" for Purposes of
Defamation Action. 19 A.L.R. 5th 1, 63 (1995) .
Respondent went beyond seeking redress in the court system.
Had Respondent only rebutted Morrow's allegations in court, and
not granted the press an interview, he may have precluded a
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finding that he is a public figure.

See Wolarnn v.

Digest Ass^n. 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979).
GertZ/ the attorney .

.

For instance,

”[i]n

. never discussed the litigation with the

press, and limited his participation in the civil litigation
solely to his representation of a private client."
U.S. at 167.

Wo1ston. 443

Unlike the subject of the defamation in Gert?..

Respondent did not limit the defense of his reputation to the
confines of the judicial system, rather. Respondent spoke to the
media.

(J.A. at 399, 428.)

Under this Court's totality of the circumstances test,
Respondent is a limited purpose public figure.

First, Respondent

assumed the risk of injury to his reputation when he stood before
the flashing cameras of the international press corps.
420-21.)

(J.A. at

Second, Respondent became the subject of the police

investigation and a subsequent conspiracy theory, drawing him
into the public controversy surrounding Kennedy's assassination.
Third, by granting the interview. Respondent proved that he had
access to the media to counter Morrow's allegation that he was
the true assassin of Robert Kennedy.

According to this Court's

holding in Reader's Digest, "such voluntary efforts to inject
oneself into the public arena require that such a person or
organization be classified as a public figure in any related
defamation actions."

37 Cal. 3d at 256 (Broussard, Acting C.J.,

expressing the unanimous view of the Court)
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(emphasis added).

II.

GLOBE DID NOT ACT WITH ACTUAL MALICE BECAUSE THE ARTICLE
PRESENTED THE TRUTH AND THE EDITORS RELIED UPON A CREDIBLE
AND REPUTABLE SOURCE.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a public

figure cannot recover damages unless it is proved upon clear and
convincing evidence that the defamatory statement was made with
actual malice.

See Gertz. 418 U.S. at 342, 349.

Furthermore,

this Court has explicitly stated that the federal standard for
actual malice must also be met for a private individual to
recover presumed or punitive damages when the speech involves a
matter of public concern.
3d 711, 747 (1989) .

Sae. Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co.. 48 Cal.

Any publication made "with knowledge that

[the statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not" constitutes actual malice.
Cn

V.

New York Timpg

Snllivan. 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).

"The critical issue is the publisher's actual belief as to
the truth or falsity of the statements made, which is a
subjective test."

Antonovich v. Superior Court, 234 Cal. App. 3d

1041, 1047 (2d Dist. 1991).

Under this subjective test for

actual malice, "[tlhere must be sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts
as to the truth of his publication."
Thompson.

Id.

(quoting St. Amant v

390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)).

Although the actual malice test is subjective,
circumstantial evidence, such as failing to investigate or
relying upon noncredible sources, may also indicate actual
malice.

See Reader's Digest, 37 Cal. 3d at 257-58.

Yet a

failure to investigate, by itself, will not be sufficient to
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prove actual malice.

See Reader^ s DiyestL. 37 Cal. 3d at 258; iiUt.

cf^ Harte-Hanks Communications._InC. V. Connaughton, 491 U.S.
657, 692 (1909)

(stating that ^purposeful avoidance of the truth

is in a different category").

This Court has noted that if the

source of the article is reputable, a failure to investigate is
inconsequential.

Reader^ s Digest. 37 Cal. 3d at 259.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit has held
that actual malice cannot be proven merely by asserting that a
publisher failed to contact the subject of his work.

See

Eastwood v. National Enquirer, No. 96-55560, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
22628, at *16 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 1997).

The Ninth Circuit has

emphatically stated that even an extreme departure from
reasonably prudent conduct and commonly accepted journalistic
standards will not suffice to prove actual malice.

See Newton v.

NBC, 930 F.2d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 1990).
An appellate court must exercise de novo review and
independently assess the entire record for clear and convincing
proof of actual malice.
835, 842 (1986).

See McCoy v. Hearst Corp.^ 42 Cal. 3d

Because a finding of actual malice can infringe

upon First Amendment rights, the trier of fact's determinations
are not binding.

See id. at 844.

[Cjourt agrees [that]

.

.

.

"In a similar vein, this

[tjhere is a greater danger that the

jury will ignore the limits of the First Amendment, find for the
plaintiff out of sympathy, or find against the defendant out of
hostility to speech that ought to be protected."

Id. at 844 n.6.

The appellate court's finding, in this case, is in direct
conflict with the constitutional protections as set forth in New
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York Times, and further secured by this Court in Reader's Digest.
The opinion below launches into its actual malice analysis by
stating that "the article is not merely false but glaringly
false."

Khawar. 51 Cal. App. 4th at 32.

Despite Justice Gold's

observation, Supreme Court precedent indicates that "[erroneous]
statement is inevitable in free debate and .

. . must be

protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive.'"
Digest. 37 Cal. 3d at 261

Reader's

(quoting New York Times. 376 U.S. at

271-72).
The opinion below next submits that the author of the copy,
John Blackburn, failed to contact the subject of Morrow's book.
gee Khawar. 51 Cal. App. 4th at 30.

However, the Ninth Circuit

has held that actual malice cannot be proven merely by asserting
that a publisher failed to contact the subject of his work.

£££

Kasr.wood. No. 96-55560, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 22628, at *16.
Moreover,

"failure to investigate before publishing, even when a

reasonably prudent person would have done so, is not sufficient
to establish reckless disregard."
at 1048.

Antonovich. 234 Cal. App. 3d

The reasoning is,

[a] non-fiction work often details events that are long
past and describes people who are unavailable to verify
the author's statements. To require a book publisher
to check, as a matter of course, every potentially
defamatory reference might raise the price of
non-fiction works beyond the resources of the average
man.^ This result would, we think, produce just such a

^
In the opinion below the appellate court suggested that
Globe should have retained a private investigator to locate Ali
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chilling effect on the free flow of ideas as First
Amendment jurisprudence has sought to avoid.
"Naantaanbuu. 816 F. Supp. at 228.

Here, the issue before this

Court is whether the editors of Globe purposefully avoided the
truth or knew that Morrow's allegations as republished in the
article were false.
A.

See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280.

Globe Did Not Make a Deliberate Decision to
Euxposefullv Avoid the Truth: Rather. Globe Presented
■tile Truth bv including Sirhan B. Sirhan's Photograpli
the Article and Identifying Him Ag Kennedy's Killer.

Globe did not purposefully avoid the truth because the
article contained a picture of Sirhan B, Sirhan and identified
him as Kennedy's killer.

(J.A. at 148.)

Moreover, there is no

direct evidence indicating that the editors of Globe made a
deliberate decision to purposefully avoid the truth.
generally Khawar, 5i Cal. App. 4th at 32-33.

See

The testimony of

the editors established that they merely failed to investigate
Morrow's allegations, but there is no direct evidence that they
made a deliberate decision to avoid the truth.

See id.

Rather,

the managing editor, Robert Taylor, testified that he believed
there was no need to investigate Morrow's story.

See -i d, at 33,

Not having a need to investigate is distinguishable from a
deliberate decision to purposefully avoid the truth.
The facts from Antonovirh demonstrate an example of the
direct evidence required to show a deliberate decision to avoid
the truth.

234 Cal. App. 3d at 1053.

In that case, Antonovich

had accused his political rival. Ward, of removing or destroying-

Ahmand.

See Khawar, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 29-30.
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the city's files.

See Antonovich. 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1044.

At

a political debate Ward confronted Antonovich about his
allegations and offered to submit exculpatory proof that he did
not remove or destroy the files.

See id. at 1053.

Antonovich

made a deliberate decision to avoid the truth by rejecting this
opportunity and, on later occasions, he repeated the allegations.
See id.
Here, there is no direct evidence in the record to indicate
that the editors rejected the truth.
Cal. App. 4th at 32-33.

See generally Khawar, 51

Rather, the article presents the truth

by identifying Sirhan B. Sirhan as Kennedy's killer.
148.)

(J.A. at

Likewise, the testimony of the managing editor indicates

that he believed there was no need to investigate Morrow's
allegations.

See Khawar, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 33.

The

circumstantial evidence in this case does not create the bridge
needed to link a failure to investigate with a deliberate
decision to avoid the truth.
Assuming the editors had decided to investigate, the
evidence available to the public would only reaffirm information
that the editors already knew, that Sirhan B. Sirhan has been
convicted of killing Kennedy.

See id. at 32.

Because Morrow's

source for his theory was dead, there was no way to confirm his
research.

(J.A. at 148.)

Had Blackburn contacted the alleged

assassin, namely Respondent, it stretches the imagination to
assume that he would do anything but deny his role in the killing
even if he truly was the killer.

While there is evidence that

the editors felt that there was no need to investigate, there is
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nothing in the record to suggest that they deliberately and
purposefully avoided the truth.
App. 4th at 32-33.

See generally Khawar. 51 Cal.

The editors failed to investigate, but the

failure was not the product of a deliberate decision to avoid the
truth.
B.

See id.
Because Morrow Has Been Linked to the CIA and
Received Commendations From Congress, the Jury Had
Support for Its Finding That He Is a Reputable Source^
Making Globe's Failure to Investigate Inconsequential.

The publishing of Robert Morrow's allegations does not
require investigation because Robert Morrow himself is a credible
source. See Reader's Digest. 37 Cal. 3d at 259.

From this

Court's holding in Reader's Digest, it is clear that,

"[a]

publisher does not have to investigate personally, but may rely
on the investigation and conclusions of reputable sources."

Id.

Robert Morrow has several characteristics that establish him as a
reputable source.

First, Morrow has engaged in covert operations

linked to the Central Intelligence Agency as evidenced by his
conviction for counterfeiting Cuban pesos.

{J.A. at 226-27.)

Second, Morrow has written three books on assassination theories
which have been published and widely distributed.
224, 517, 583.)

(J.A. at 218,

Third, Morrow's book. Betrayal, has been

commended by Congress for its fundamental contribution to the
creation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

(J.A,

at 220.)
Robert Morrow has been identified by the publisher of one of
his previous books as being both a "contract agent" and a "senior
C.I.A. agent."

(J.A. at 224-25.)
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His links to the Central

Intelligence Agency derive from his 1965 conviction for
counterfeiting Cuban pesos.

(J.A. at 228.)

Morrow's

codefendant, Mario Kohly, presented a letter in those proceedings
written on his behalf by former Vice President Richard Nixon.
(J.A. at 227-28.)

Richard Nixon, the future President of the

United States of America, wrote:
[T]he acts which lead to [Kohly's] conviction, although
unlawful, were not motivated by any desire for personal
gain, but rather from a dedication to his country. . .
[I]t is possible that, in the face of a difficult,
dangerous, and challenging situation, the complexities
of the United State's policy toward the Castro regime,
particularly as it has affected the exiles, might well
have created the atmosphere in which a person such as
[Kohly] could honestly, though mistakenly, believe that
actions such as those for which he was convicted were
not contrary to the interest of the United States. . .
The exiles have . . . been encouraged and aided by
the United States in efforts to overthrow the Cuban
government.
(J.A. at 230-31.)

As demonstrated by Morrow's close connections

to an individual directly linked to the highest powers in the
United States government. Morrow is a reputable source on subject
matter concerning covert operations.
Not only do Robert Morrow's connections establish his
credibility, but also, his success as a widely published author
further confirms his expertise in assassination theories.
Morrow's first book. Betrayal, exposing an assassination theory
regarding President John F. Kennedy's killing, was a bestseller.
(J.A. at 517.)

In publishing The Senator Must Die. Roundtable

produced 25,000 copies for sale to the public.

(J.A. at 517.)

Finally, in early June of 1993 at a conference on the
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assassinations of John Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther
King, Morrow participated in a panel discussion on Robert
Kennedy's death alongside other assassination researchers.
at 498, 500.)

(J.A.

fiee Reader's Digest. 37 Cal. 3d at 258-59 (finding

a professor and author to be a reputable source).

Because Morrow

is a best-selling author who is recognized as an authority on
assassinations, he is both reputable and credible.

(J.A. at 498,

500, 517.)
The strongest endorsement of Robert Morrow's credibility
comes not from the public's demand for his work, but from
Congress itself.

Congressman Thomas Downing has bestowed direct

praise on Robert Morrow in recognition of his indispensable role
in creating the House Select Committee on Assassinations.
219-20.)

In a letter to Morrow, Downing wrote,

(J.A.

''[i]t is no

exaggeration to say that the information in rBetrayall, coupled
with additional confidential material supplied to me by Mr.
Morrow, helped make the creation of the House Select Committee on
Assassinations possible."

(J.A. at 220.)

This congressional

commendation, along with Morrow's high government connections and
successful publishing endeavors, provides more than sufficient
evidence for this Court to affirm the jury's finding that Morrow
is a reputable source.
In summation, a finding of actual malice is simply not
supported by the evidence.

Globe did not recklessly or

purposefully avoid the truth; rather, the article included a
photograph of Sirhan B. Sirhan and identified him as the
convicted killer.

(J.A. at 148.)
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Furthermore, because Globe

republished the allegations of a reputable source, a finding of
actual malice based entirely upon a failure to conduct a thorough
investigation is plain error.

By presenting two alternative

theories to Kennedy's assassination, Globe enabled the public to
debate for themselves and determine where the real truth lies.
Because ''[erroneous] statement is inevitable in free debate [it].
.

. must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have

the 'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive.'"
Reader's Digest. 37 Cal. 3d at 261 (quoting New York Times, 376
U.S. at 271-72).
III. THE FACTS OF THIS CASE ARE RIPE FOR THIS COURT TO EXPRESSLY
ADOPT THE NEUTRAL REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE TO PROTECT ROBUST AND
WIDE OPEN DEBATE ON PUBLIC CONTROVERSIES.
This Court should expressly adopt a neutral reportage
privilege to allow the press the "breathing space," free from the
daunting threat of litigation, so that debate on public issues
can remain "uninhibited, robust, and wide open."

The Court of

Appeals, Second Circuit, has stated that "[t]he public interest
in being fully informed about controversies that often rage
around sensitive issues demands that the press be afforded the
freedom to report such charges without assuming responsibility
for them."

Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d

113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977).
In Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d
113 (2d Cir.) . . , the Second Circuit elucidated for
the first time a constitutional privilege of neutral
reportage, under which a republisher who accurately and
disinterestedly reports certain defamatory statements
made against public figures is shielded from liability.
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regardless of the republisher's subjective awareness of
the truth or falsity of the accusation.
Barry v. Time, Inc. / 584 F. Supp. mo, 1123 (n.d. Cal. 1984).
Following the lead of the Second Circuit, the Eighth Circuit
has also adopted a neutral reportage privilege.

See Price v.

Viking Eenguin. Inc./ 88I F.2d 1426, 1434 (8th Cir. 1989); sse
alSQ In re UPI^ 106 B.R. 323, 331 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1989)

(adopting

the neutral reportage privilege in the District of Columbia
Circuit for the first time).

In Price, the court held that even

harmful statements made by public bodies, if republished
accurately, are protected.

881 F.2d at 1429, 1434.

For the

neutral reportage privilege to apply, the journal must act in
good faith, accurately report, and may not concur in the charges
made by others.

See id. at 1434.

One function of the neutral reportage privilege is to allow
a republisher to report upon a newsworthy charge made by a
declarant.

In reporting these charges, even when done accurately

and neutrally, one must often repeat the defamatory statement.
R.W.C., Note, The Developing Privilege of Neutral Reportage.
69 Va. L. Rev. 853, 867 (1983).

"In many cases the public has an

interest in knowing that a certain individual made a particular
charge.

It is logically impossible to convey such information

without republishing the charge itself."

Id.

The neutral reportage privilege applies when "the otherwise
defamed person is (1) a public figure^ (2) involved in an
existing public controversy,

^

(3) the defamatory statement is made

But see discussion infra p. 34.
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by a person to that controversy and (4) is republished accurately
and neutrally."

Crane v. Arizona Republic. 729 F. Supp. 698, 710

(C.D. Cal. 1989).

Although the district court did not apply the

privilege in Crane. in justifying the neutral reportage doctrine
the court stated that the privilege "serves to promote freedom to
report statements regarding public controversies which involve
public figures."
A.

Id. at 711.

California Has Already Used the Rationale of the
Mentral Reportage Privilege Within the Actual Malice
TPflt and Fair and True Report Privilege.

In looking at the progeny of Edwards within California, the
case law indicates that California courts are gradually accepting
the neutral reportage privilege.

For instance, in Weingarten,

addressing the issue of neutral reports of inaccurate
information, the court stated that ”[a]Ithough accuracy and
objectivity in reporting are goals for which all responsible news
media strive, the protection of the First Amendment is not
limited to statements whose validity are beyond question or which
reflect an objective picture of the reported events."

102 Cal.

App. 3d at 151.
In that case, Saul Weingarten was subject to accusations
questioning his integrity as a City Attorney.

See ilL. at 142.

After his dismissal, the publishers of a local newspaper
published a story in which they implied that Weingarten's ethics
were badly wanting.

See id. at 140.

Their sources, Ehrman and

Murray, charged Weingarten with using the powers of his office to
profit through illegal real estate transactions.
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See id. at 148.

There was no evidence in the record to support these allegations,
yet, the newspaper republished them.

See Weingarten. 102 Cal.

App. 3d at 140, 148.
The California Court of Appeal found that the newspaper was
not liable because there was no actual malice.

See id. at 150.

In their determination the court used the underlying rationale
for the neutral reportage privilege, veiled behind the actual
malice analysis.

The court found no malice because of the simple

finding that "every statement [in the article] has been traced to
an identifiable source."

Id.

Furthermore, the court noted that

the statements were newsworthy merely because they had been made.
id. at 148.

Essentially, the court shielded the newspaper

for republishing harmful accusations because they were not the
original source of the statements.

The court was pushing the

boundaries of the actual malice standard by protecting those who
neutrally and accurately republish a defamatory falsehood that
is, in and of itself, newsworthy.
The actual malice standard has long protected those who
mistakenly publish defamatory falsehoods.
376 U.S. at 267.

See Mew York

Times.

Weingarfen demonstrates that the language of

the actual malice test neglects a class of people who deserve
First Amendment protection, namely those who are neutrally and
accurately republishing known defamatory falsehoods.
Weingarten*s acknowledgment of the neutral reportage
privilege is demonstrated by its citation to Edwards. the
premiere case on the privilege:
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The First Amendment protects the reporting of charges
against a public official or figure 'regardless of the
reporters private views regarding their validity. What
is newsworthy about such accusations was that they were
made. We do not believe that the press may be required
under the First Amendment to suppress newsworthy
statements merely because it has serious doubts
regarding their truth.
Weingarten. 102 Cal. App, 3d at 148 (quoting Edwards, 556 F.2d at
120).

The appearance of this language in a California case shows

that California has already begun to incorporate the neutral
reportage privilege.
Three short years later, the Fourth District, Court of
Appeal applied California's statutory privilege for "fair and
true reports" to protect a known defamatory falsehood made
against a public official.
section 47,

According to California Civil Code

"[a] fair and true report of a judicial proceeding is

privileged."

Grille v. Smithy 144 Cal. App. 3d 868, 873 (4th

Dist. 1983).

In Grillo, a Los Angeles Times article reported

upon Municipal Court Judge Joseph Grille, who detained a county
transportation official for a contempt hearing.

Id. at 871.

Grille was attempting to avoid "red tape" in obtaining airline
tickets.

See id. at 871.

used such words as:
court."

Id. at 868.

in reporting upon this event the Timp^s

"angry", "shouted",

"stormed", and "kangaroo

The court held that these words were

statements of opinion as a matter of law.

See

at 871.

Moreover, despite the contentious nature of these words, the
court found that these utterances, as well as a "red tape"
statement made out of context, were also privileged as a "fair
and true" report under California law.
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See id. at 873.

----- --- -lac
while the singular words were found to be opinion, the fact
that the "red tape" statement was made by Grille was found to
have supportive evidence.

Set> Gr-illn. 144 Cal. App. 3d at 871.

The court found that accurately reporting upon a public
official's statement during a judicial proceeding is privileged.
Sfig xd. at 873.

Then, the court expounded upon this idea to

include that even a known falsehood may be reported upon so long
as the report is "fair and true."

See id.

"Thus, a fair and

true report of a known falsehood concerning a private citizen
uttered in a judicial proceeding is not actionable."^

Xd-.-

Thus,

in Grillo, the California Court of Appeal incorporated the
neutral reportage privilege under section 47, the "fair and true
report privilege," because they found that under certain
circumstances one can knowingly publish a defamatory utterance
made in a judicial proceeding.

Id.

This finding is an important

distinction in defining what a fair and true report is.

That a

In recognition of the grave importance in granting the press
the freedom to provide the public with information regarding
newsworthy events, the California legislature has already adopted
a fair and true report privilege. California Civil Code section
47(d) protects:
"a fair and true report in, or a communication
to, a public journal, of (A) a judicial, (B) legislative, or (C)
other public official proceeding, or (D) of anything said in the
course thereof, or (E) of a verified charge or complaint made by
any person to a public official, upon which complaint a warrant
has been issued." Cal. Civ. Code § 47(d) (West 1997) . Section
47(e) protects:
"a fair and true report of (1) the proceedings
of a public meeting, if the meeting was lawfully convened for a
lawful purpose and open to the public, or (2) the publication of
the matter complained of was for the public benefit." Cal. Civ.
Code § 47(e) (West 1997).
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true report can be made on a known falsehood demonstrates a great
similarity between the meanings of "fair and true" and "neutral
and accurate."

"Fair and true" after Grillo no longer hinges

upon knowing whether the statement which is reported upon is true
or false, but rather on the accuracy of the reporting.
B.

Several Courts,—including District Courts Within thp
Ninth Circuit. Are Adopting and Utilizing the Neutral
Reportage Privilege to Protect the Republication of
Known Defamatory Falsehoods, Even in Cases Involving
Private Individual «■

District courts within the Ninth Circuit have adopted a free
standing neutral reportage privilege, independent of the
constraints of the actual malice test and fair comment privilege,
to extend constitutional protection to those who neutrally and
accurately republish a known defamatory falsehood.

See Barry.

584 F. Supp. at 1127; Ward v. News Group Tnt'l. T.td., 733 F.
Supp. 83, 84 (C.D. Cal. 1990)
reportage privilege).

(protecting Globe under the neutral

In Barry, Judge Patel rejected the

rationale behind Dickey v. CBS Inn., 583 F.2d 1221 (3rd Cir.
1978) , the leading federal case against the adoption of the
neutral reportage privilege.

See Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1124.

Judge Patel held that neither, "Gertz, St. Amant or any other
Supreme Court pronouncement precludes recognition of the [neutral
reportage] privilege."

Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1124.

Judge Patel

concluded that the public's interest in obtaining information
pertaining to a public controversy requires that liability not be
placed upon those who republish a known defamatory falsehood.
See id.

33

This Court has pointed out that the fair and true report
privilege under California Civil Code section 47 does not
expressly protect the right to make false statements about purely
private individuals on matters of public interest.
Cal. 3d at 719.

fiee Brown,

In Brown, Kelly Broadcasting Company ran a new^

story in which they portrayed Shirley Brown, a contractor, to b^
incompetent at her work.

Id^ at 720.

Willis, the reporter for

Kelly Broadcasting, made the initial allegations that Brown's
work was "shoddy."

See isL. at 719.

Kelly also broadcast a

second story in which another contractor was criticized, yet th^t
contractor appeared on the show to defend himself.

See id.

This Court held that the fair and true report privilege di(;j
not extend to protecting defamatory statements made against
Shirley Brown, a private figure.

S&s.

What Brown does not

is address the republishing of statements, the fundamental
element of the neutral reportage privilege.

This discussion in

Brown of the fair and true report privilege should not constrairi
this Court from establishing a neutral reportage privilege that
applies to private figures.

In Law Firm of Daniel

p.

FostP-r,

E.C. V. Turner Broad. System. Inc.. 844 F.2d 955, 961 (2d Cir.
1988), the Second Circuit suggested that it is "arguably an
extension of Edwards to apply [the neutral reportage privilege]
to litigation brought by a private figure involved in a matter of
public concern."

See..alsQ April v. Reflectnr--Herald. Tnr,. 546

N.E,2d 466, 469 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988)

(holding that the neutral

reportage privilege applies when the plaintiff is a private
figure).
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By adopting the neutral reportage privilege, this Court will
properly balance the right of the press to foster public debate
with the individual's right to recover for damages to his or her
reputation.

Under the neutral reportage privilege the

individual's right to recover is not barred because the privilege
only shields the republisher, not the original defamer from a
libel action.

Commentators have noted that "the neutral

reportage privilege in no way affects the ability of the
individual defamed to pursue a defamation action against the
original publisher. .

.

.

[T]he original publisher will be

liable for the full extent of any reasonably foreseeable harm."
Mark W. Page, Note, Price v. Viking Penguin. Inc.:

The Neutral

Reportage Privilege and Robust. Wide Open Debate. 75 Minn. L.
Rev. 157, 197 (1990).
California has been incorporating the neutral reportage
privilege, though not always by name, for almost two decades.
Pdwards established the privilege in the Second Circuit in 1977,
and since then California has repeatedly imported the language
and rationale from this landmark decision.

In Weingarten, the

California Court of Appeal utilized the rationale of the neutral
reportage privilege veiled behind the actual malice test.
Similarly, in Grillo, the California Court of Appeal veiled the
neutral reportage privilege behind the fair and true report
privilege.

In Barry and Ward, two Federal District Courts within

the Ninth Circuit adopted and applied the neutral reportage
privilege.

This Court now has the opportunity to drop the veil

and establish the neutral reportage privilege in California.
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Because an individual can always seek redress from the original
source of the defamation, the neutral reportage privilege need
not distinguish between public and private individuals.
C.

The Evidence Supports the Jury's Finding That Globe
Meutrallv and Accurately Reported Morrow^s Allegations.

The facts of this case are ripe for this Court to expressly
adopt the neutral reportage privilege because Globe neutrally and
accurately republished Morrow's allegations.

Morrow's book

presents one of the many theories surrounding the assassination
of Senator Kennedy.

(J.A. at 507, 566.)

Morrow wrote that the

triggerman was not Sirhan B. Sirhan, but rather, a man named Ali
Ahmand.

{J.A. at 566.)

with the caption:

The book also contained four pictures

"Ali Ahmand in sweater, next to Robert Kennedy

minutes before Kennedy was assassinated.

Note SLR camera."

(J.A. at 151, 159, 579-80.)
The headline of Globe's article stated: "Formpr CIA agent
claims:
148.)

IRANIANS

killed bobby

KENNEDY FOR THE MAFIA."

(J.A. at

Two photographs appeared below the headline, one with an

arrow directed at the likeness of respondent as he stood on the
podium next to Kennedy, the other of Sirhan B. Sirhan.
148.)

The accompanying caption states:

(J.A. at

"Author Robert Morrow

claims an Iranian agent (arrow), not Sirhan Sirhan (right),
killed Kennedy with a gun disguised to look like a camera."
(J.A. at 148.)
In this case. Globe merely published an article presenting
Morrow's theory on the assassination of Senator Kennedy.
Jonathan Kirsh, an expert retained by Globe, testified that the
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article "fairly, straightforwardly reports what is written and
published in that book."

(J.A. at 469.)

Consequently, the jury

specifically found that the article was an accurate and neutral
report of the statements and charges made by Morrow,
595.)

(J.A. at

According to the jury instructions given by the trial

judge, in reaching the determination that the article was an
accurate and neutral report, the jury had to, and thus did find:
1) that Robert D, Morrow is a responsible and
prominent source; 2) that the statements or claims
reported on were newsworthy; 3) that the report
neutrally and accurately conveys the statements;
4) that the report did not espouse or concur in the
charges made; and 5) that the publisher believes
reasonably and in good faith, that his or her report
accurately conveys the statements made.
(J.A. at 64.)
In reviewing the jury's determination that the article was a
neutral and accurate report, Edwards states that the appropriate
standard of review is whether or not the jury's finding of fact
was clearly erroneous.

556 F.2d at 120.

"Implicit in the jury's

verdict ... is the finding, which we must accept that the Times
accurately reported [the accusations]."

Id.

(emphasis added).

Edwards held that a rejection of the jury's finding of fact is
"constitutionally impermissible."

Id.

In this case, the jury found Globe's article to be a neutral
and accurate report of Morrow's allegations.

The facts of this

case are ripe for this Court to expressly adopt the neutral
reportage privilege in California.

To do otherwise would deprive

the public of newsworthy information about raging public
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controversies.

Ultimately, society must be trusted to determine

for themselves whether a statement is "true.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Globe International,
Inc. respectfully requests this Court to find that Respondent is
a limited purpose public figure and that Globe did not act with
actual malice.

Petitioner also requests this Court to expressly

adopt the neutral reportage privilege and reverse the judgment of
the appellate court.

Dated:

October 30, 1997

Seth M. Gerber

William M. Sloan
Counsel for Petitioner
Globe International, Inc.
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